Since the official start of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) on January 1, 2005, electricity prices in several EU Member States have increased rapidly. Some have argued that these price increases are predominantly due to the passing through of the (opportunity) costs of freely allocated CO 2 emission allowances to the power sector, resulting in significant additional (windfall) profits for this sector. In some countries, this has resulted in a lively debate in which both politicians and major power-intensive users have suggested that the EU ETS induced increases in power prices and windfall profits should be addressed by means of adequate policy measures.
The major purpose of the paper is to analyse a variety of options to address EU ETS induced increases in power prices and windfall profits, notably whether these options are effective and whether they have other (adverse) effects as well.
First of all, however, a summary is presented of the estimated impact of the EU ETS on power prices and generators' profits, based on empirical research and model simulations of the wholesale markets in North-western Europe, particularly Germany and the Netherlands (Sijm et al., 2005 and 2006) . Analysing trends in power prices on these markets for the year 2005 show that both peak and off-peak prices have increased substantially due to three causes: 1. Increases in fuel prices (notably when a gas-fired plant is the price-setting technology). 2. Pass through of (rising) CO 2 costs of EU ETS allowances. 3. Other factors, especially growing capacity scarcities on the power market.
Estimates of the average pass through rates in Germany vary between 70 and 100 percent for the year 2005 as a whole. Based on these estimates, the share of CO 2 cost pass through in total power price increases varies between 16 percent for gas-generated power in the Netherlands (peak period) to 57 percent for coal-fired power in Germany (off-peak), while the remaining part is due to fuel increases (in particular in the Netherlands) and growing scarcities on the wholesale markets (notably in Germany).
When discussing EU ETS induced changes in generators' (windfall) profits), it is important to make a distinction between windfall profits due to: A. EU ETS induced changes in power prices, sales volumes and costs. B. Free allocations of CO 2 emission allowances.
For North-western European countries, model scenario estimates of windfall profits (in % of baseline profits) vary between -2 and 42 percent for the first category (A), between 10 and 46 percent for the second category (B), and between 8 and 88 percent for total windfall profits (A+B). In addition, empirical estimates of windfall profits (in absolute figures) vary between € € 300-400 mln/a for the Netherlands (based on a free allocation of 35 MtCO 2 /a to the power sector) and between € € 1200-1300 for the UK (based on a free allocation of 134 MtCO 2 /a).
Depending on one's perspective, induced increases in power prices and windfall profits (A and/or B) can be regarded as an (un)intended, (ir)rational effect of the scheme. As far as these effects are regarded as a problem to be addressed, several options can be considered, including:
• Indirect allocation of free allowances (i.e. to power consumers rather than power producers).
• Auctioning of emission allowances and recycling of auction revenues.
• Relative benchmarking or output-based allocation.
• Taxation of carbon emissions and recycling of tax revenues.
• Price regulation on the wholesale, retail power and or carbon market.
• Reducing CO 2 allowance prices.
• Encouraging power sector competition • Providing state aid to energy-intensive industries (IIEs).
• Promoting EII strategies such as energy saving, self generation or long term power price contracts.
• Border tax adjustments.
• Long term options such as global climate policy agreements or technological innovations.
The paper discusses the above-mentioned options, notably whether they address the EU ETS induced increases in both power prices and generators' windfall profits (A and/or B) and whether they have other (unintended, adverse) effects or not. The major findings of this discussion are summarised in an overview table. In summary, the major conclusions of the paper are:
• Power prices in North-western EU countries such as Germany and the Netherlands have increased substantially during 2005, but only part (16-57%) is due to CO 2 cost pass through, depending on the country, load period and generation technology considered.
• Generators' profits have risen significantly due to EU ETS induced increases in power prices and free allocations of CO 2 allowances.
• There are hardly any policy options that address both EU ETS induced increases in power prices and windfall profits without adverse, socio-economic effects. However, as far as EU ETS induced increases in power prices and windfall profits are regarded as an issue or problem to be addressed, a combination of options could be considered, including auctioning of emission allowances (to sheltered sectors), recycling of auction revenues (particularly to power consumers), benchmark or output-based allocation (to sectors exposed to competition outside the EU ETS), reducing CO 2 prices, and encouraging technological innovations.
